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COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF OPERATING
SOFTWARE, COPYRIGHT MISUSE,
AND ANTITRUST
Dennis S. Karala t
ABSTRACT
The fundamental problem in the Microsoft antitrust litigation is not
Microsoft's abusive or predatory behavior but rather the socially subop-
timal combination of a strong copyright in operating software with a
market in which network effects inexorably reduce the efficient number
of competitors. Because of network effects, structural remedies like
breaking up Microsoft are unlikely to be effective or to encourage an
optimal level of technological innovation. It is Microsoft's overly strong
copyright that must be limited, so that the public benefits of a large,
standardized network are maintained while allowing firms other than the
copyright owner to seek technological innovations in the dominant oper-
ating software. This is best achieved by mandating full public disclosure
of the Windows source code and a compulsory license allowing third
parties to develop improved versions of the software.
INTRODUCTION
In the abstract, intellectual property and antitrust coexist in a state of
superficial tension. The latter abhors monopolies, or at least the abuse of
monopoly power, while the former actually creates monopolies through
force of law. Traditionally, courts have resolved this tension in the only
way possible that preserves the essence of both statutory regimes, partic-
ularly the integrity of the federal patent and copyright statutes: Exercise
of the exclusive rights granted to an inventor or author, without more, is
not unlawful under antitrust law. To rise to the level of an antitrust vio-
lation, a rights owner must use monopoly power, whether or not that
power arises from intellectual property rights, either to expand the statu-
tory intellectual property monopoly to products not covered by the un-
derlying patent or copyright or to enter into agreements with others
t Professor of Law, Arizona State University. B.S.E. 1961, Princeton University; M.S.
1963, Ph.D. 1965, University of Illinois (Urbana); J.D. 1972, University of California (Berke-
ley). The author gratefully acknowledges helpful comments on an earlier draft from Profes-
sors Mark Lemley, Leo Raskind, Jon Rose, and Ralph Spritzer.
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regarding the intellectual property rights (including others holding intel-
lectual property rights in different products) that restrain trade.'
The antitrust litigation involving Microsoft Corporation, while of
enormous potential importance to the economy and, perhaps, even to the
future of innovation in the information age, fits easily within this tradi-
tional description. The government seeks to prove that Microsoft levered
its legal copyright monopoly in the Windows operating software to re-
strain trade in a variety of compatible products designed to run on the
Windows platform. If this enormously successful company is found to
have violated the antitrust laws, the legal community will have to do
some hard thinking about the appropriate remedy in an effort to ensure
that we do not throw out the baby with the bath water.
This article does not attempt to analyze the facts, theories, or argu-
ments in Microsoft. It does, however, recommend remedies that might
be appropriate should Microsoft be found to be an antitrust violator. The
proposal represents a cautious first step toward implementing a new the-
ory of antitrust that permits remedial action even without a showing of
the kind of predatory behavior that courts have heretofore required in
finding an antitrust violation.2 The article begins not from antitrust but
rather from copyright and reconsiders Microsoft's exclusive copyright
rights. It asks the questions: Why does one company have broad and
very long-term copyright rights, as opposed to patent rights, in technol-
ogy that serves (at least for the present) as the gateway to personal com-
puting; did we err in affording copyright rights to computer software, or
at least in failing to distinguish between application programs and operat-
ing systems; and if we did err in recognizing copyright protection in op-
erating software, can the error be corrected through the normal
legislative process?
It was completely predictable that proprietary rights in operating
software would eventually allow a single company to dominate the gate-
way, because consumer desire for standards permitting interoperability
drives the market in that direction. The dominant company can extract a
higher toll from everyone traversing the gate than could be charged if
there were multiple entry points. It also has a lower incentive to innovate
I See Ronald S. Katz, Janet Arnold Hart, & Adam J. Safer, Intellectual Property vs.
Antitrust: A False Dilemma, 15 COMPUTER L., No. 11, at 8, 9 (Nov. 1998) (arguing that pat-
ents and copyrights serve public purposes but that expansion of a resulting dominant position
to another market outside these exclusive rights regimes may be an antitrust violation). The
Supreme Court has stated that acquiring or maintaining a monopoly through "a superior prod-
uct, business acumen, or historic accident" does not rise to the level of an antitrust violation.
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
2 As this article went to press, the district court had just issued its determination that
Microsoft did, in fact, engage in predatory behavior sanctionable by traditional antitrust law.
For early commentary on Judge Jackson's findings of fact, see Robert H. Bork, A Predatory
Monopoly and George L. Priest, A Feeble Case, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1999, at A50.
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than it would have in a more competitive market. Where operating
software has become, for whatever reason, a de facto standard, continued
recognition of full-fledged copyright rights is unwise social policy. Soci-
ety should not allow these conditions to continue for the long term of
copyright, regardless of whether the dominant company has engaged in
the kind of predatory activity typically required to show an antitrust
violation.3
If copyright is the problem, is not the answer then a revision of
copyright to recalibrate the balance between creation incentives and free
use, either for computer programs in general or for operating software in
particular? Unfortunately, this logical approach raises another problem,
which is the unwillingness (indeed, near structural incapacity) of Con-
gress to retrench copyright rights once recognized. The extension of
copyright protection to computer programs is probably the most dra-
matic, and least justifiable, expansion of copyright in its 200-plus years
of existence in the United States, but it represents simply another step in
the ever broader, stronger, and longer copyright rights that Congress has
been recognizing from copyright's inception. Congress has a ratchet for
copyright protection that sends it in only one direction-more for owners
of existing copyrights and less for current and future authors and for the
public generally. We cannot expect Congress to attempt to solve the
problem, let alone come up with a solution that optimizes the public in-
terest, by focusing on copyright law alone. The answer must come from
outside of copyright or from the courts.
In fact, the judiciary has come alive in recent years with its increas-
ing recognition of copyright misuse as a defense to a copyright infringe-
ment action. It seems possible that this doctrine will be serviceable to
handle at least some of the special problems arising from computer pro-
gram copyrights, particularly where the copyright owner seeks to parlay
its program copyright into the power to control products or services not
covered by the copyright. Copyright misuse, however, is unlikely to be a
complete answer to the problem of long-term proprietary rights in the
gateway. Because of network effects, the problems of very-long-term
monopoly profits and reduced innovation in operating software remain
even if the rights owner does not attempt to extend its monopoly beyond
the scope of the copyright.
3 By making modest improvements every few years, the dominant company can parlay
its initial position into one of near perpetuity, at least in principle. Given the pace of techno-
logical development, however, we would expect technology itself to provide the necessary
"fix" eventually, even if the law is unresponsive. Although the entry barriers to the operating
software market are high, the initial success of the Linux system may show that they are not
insurmountable. Nevertheless, the same problem remains with us even if the initially domi-
nant company is dislodged, unless the successor software, like Linux, is nonproprietary. See
infra note 39 and text accompanying notes 33-46.
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We are left with antitrust. As currently formulated, antitrust faces
many of the same difficulties as copyright misuse in addressing the gate-
way problem. In principle, it is not an antitrust violation simply to ex-
ploit an intellectual property right to the extent of the scope of that right.
Nevertheless, it seems more fundamentally sound to address the gateway
problem from the perspective of antitrust policy rather than through ap-
plication of the doctrine of copyright misuse. "Misuse" requires some
wrongful act that offends copyright policy, which leaves the analysis
within the overall copyright arena. Antitrust, on the other hand, invokes
more general policies of free and open competition. These antitrust poli-
cies are not antithetical to copyright, but they place the problem in a
different perspective. This perspective helps break the legislative logjam
that prevents retrenching an overly strong copyright.4 What we need is
an antitrust theory that takes the dynamics of technological innovation
into account in determining whether an intellectual property rights owner
has unlawfully "monopolized" its statutory grant. The theory must en-
compass remedial action against such monopolies that preserves the pub-
lic benefits of network externalities as well as the incentives to innovate
supplied by intellectual property law.
I. COMPUTER PROGRAMS AS COPYRIGHT
SUBJECT MATTER
Why are we suddenly so interested in the interrelationship of copy-
right and antitrust, and the related issue of copyright misuse? Simply
put, the answer is copyright protection of digital technology. Traditional
copyright subject matter like art, music, and literature rarely raise even
colorable claims of market power or monopolization. Antitrust and mis-
use claims related to traditional copyrights have generally involved
charges of expanding the copyright monopoly in individual works by
means of agreements with other copyright owners 5 or by tying the
purchase of less desirable works to the license of the desired work. 6
Many of these cases arose in the special contexts of film distribution or
4 See infra notes 47-67, 105 and accompanying text. At least one commentator has
reached similar conclusions as those presented herein, namely, that the Microsoft problem
derives not from bad behavior, but from Microsoft's market share, network effects that main-
tain market share, and the software copyright. See Jonathan Zittrain, The Un-Microsoft Un-
Remedy: Law can Prevent the Problem that it can't Patch Later, 31 CONN. L. REv. 1361
(1999) (also recommending new legislation that would limit software copyrights to five years).
5 E.g., M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948) (refusal by
performance rights society, representing many copyright owners, to offer licenses to movie
theater owners covering individual works in place of a blanket license covering the society's
entire portfolio held to be copyright misuse), appeal dismissed on motion of appellee sub nom.
M. Witmark & Sons v. Berger Amusement Co., 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1949).
6 E.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (film distributor practice of
tying unwanted films to license of desired feature films violates section I of the Sherman Act).
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the operation of the performance rights societies, which represent simul-
taneously many owners of music copyrights.
At least one commentator has argued that traditional copyrights, by
themselves, do not confer market power because there is a large degree
of substitutability among literary and artistic worksJ Perhaps an even
stronger reason is that the monopoly in traditional copyright subject mat-
ter is self-limiting no matter how popular the work. Few read the same
novel or see the same movie over and over again to the exclusion of
other novels and movies. Consumers can read novels faster than authors
can write them, so no single author can maintain a monopoly position in
the sale of novels, even in the rare case of an author who has become so
popular that she can be sure of having a best-seller before putting pen to
paper. Thus, traditional copyright subject matter is an end in itself,
rather than a tool that is often reused. The very nature of traditional
works of authorship prevents large-scale market power from developing.
Of course, some types of copyright subject matter, such as dictiona-
ries, maps, and, now, computer programs, are designed for reference and
other purposes that require reuse by consumers. Copyright law addresses
the potential problem of monopoly in these works in two ways, both of
which are instructive on the market-power question.8 First, the cases se-
verely limit the scope of protection in informational or reference works
so that the copyright protects only against verbatim copying or very close
paraphrasing. 9 Such "thin" copyrights are effective against direct (mis-
appropriative) copying but at the same time help insure that competitors
who are willing to make a similar investment of time, money, and effort
7 Ramsey Hanna, Note, Misusing Antitrust: The Search for Functional Copyright Mis-
use Standards, 46 STA. L. REv. 401, 415 (1994).
8 The recognition that fundamental limits on copyright protection arise through a nar-
row definition of "expression" for informational works and a judicial reluctance to allow copy-
right in a protected work to control markets beyond the work itself been most fully developed
and articulated by Professor Reichman. See J.H. Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied
Scientific Know-How: Implications of Copyright Protection for Commercialized University
Research, 42 VrD. L. REv. 639, 692-93 & n.288 (1989) [hereinafter Applied Scientific
Know-How]; see also Brief Amicus Curiae of Copyright Law Professors, Sega Enterprises Ltd.
v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992), amended by Order and Amended Opinion,
D.C. No. CV-91-3871-BAC, Jan. 6, 1993, at 18-22 [hereinafter Sega Amicus Brie], reprinted
33 JuenRaudcs J. 147, 156-59 (1992). See generally J.H. Reichman, Goldstein on Copyright
Law: A Realist's Approach to a Technological Age, 43 STAN. L. REv. 943, 970-76 (1991).
9 See, e.g., Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (factual compi-
lation); Bellsouth Advertising & Pub. Corp. v. Donnelley Information Pub., Inc., 999 F.2d
1436 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (yellow page categories and information contained therein);
Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1984) (game
strategy); Miller v. Universal Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981) (history); Hoehling
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 980 (2nd Cir. 1980) (historical theory), cert.
.denied, 449 U.S. 841; Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2nd
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967) (biography); Continental Casualty Co. v.
Beardsley, 253 F.2d 720 (2nd Cir. 1958) (legal form), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958).
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are able to produce works that can compete on the merits.' 0 This was the
basis of the "sweat of the brow" theory of copyright originality that was
overturned by the Supreme Court" but is likely soon to return in the
form of a new database protection statute purportedly grounded on Com-
merce Clause powers.' 2
Second, until computer programs came along, copyright generally
eschewed protection of truly functional works - works whose value in-
heres in what they do for human beings rather than in what they say or
how they appear to human beings. The copyright in a book, for example,
does not extend to systems and procedures that are described in the
book.' 3 Similarly, copyright in a two-dimensional design document or
10 See generally Dennis S. Kajala, Copyright and Misappropriation, 17 U. DAYTON L.
Rnv. 885 (1992) (discussing the role of misappropriation notions in defining the scope of
copyright protection for various classes of copyright subject matter) [hereinafter Copyright
and Misappropriation].
11 Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
12 H.R. 354, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999). For an argument that database legislation
based on the Commerce Clause may be unconstitutional unless more carefully tailored to cor-
rect a market failure and not simply to reverse a constitutionally grounded Supreme Court
decision, see Malla Pollack, The Right to Know? Delimiting Database Protection at the Junc-
ture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the First Amendment, 17
CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47 (1999). Professor Patry has argued more generally, based on
Supreme Court jurisprudence and constitutional structure, that Congress may not adopt legisla-
tion protecting unoriginal works, or elements of works, under either the Patent and Copyright
Clause or the Commerce Clause. See generally William Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doc-
trine and Intellectual Property: An Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. Rv.
359 (1999). Professor Patry distinguishes federal trademark law (except for the recently cre-
ated right against dilution of famous marks) as not creating a "property" right but rather as
legislation aimed at preventing consumer confusion. Id. at 391-93. A second bill is moving
through the House of Representatives via the Commerce Committee, rather than the Judiciary
Committee, to which "intellectual property" legislation is normally referred. H.R. 1858, 106th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1999). This bill purports not to create a new "property right" in databases,
but does protect against misappropriation of the expensive-to-gather information they contain.
See House Commerce Approves Database Bill: Modifications Possible Prior to Floor Vote, 4
BNA ELEacRoNIc ComwmRci & L., No. 31, at 713 (August 11, 1999).
13 This is the basic message of Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880) (holding that the
copyright in a book explaining a new system of accounting did not extend to the system itself)
and section 102(b) of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. ' 102(b)(1994). See also, e.g., Chamberlin
v. Uris Sales Corporation, 150 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir. 1945) (copyright in a rulebook for the card
game "Acy-Ducy" not infringed by a book describing the same rules in different language);
Affiliated Enter., Inc. v. Gruber, 86 F.2d 958 (Ist Cir. 1936) (promotional scheme protectible
only by patent, regardless of quality or development cost); Affiliated Enter., Inc. v. Gantz, 86
F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1936) (similar promotional scheme); Brief English Systems, Inc. v. Owen,
48 F.2d 555, 556 (2nd Cir. 1931) (only patent is available to protect a new system of short-
hand), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 858; Arica Institute, Inc. v. Palmer, 761 F. Supp. 1056 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (method of describing psychological traits not protected); Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v.
Carabio, 203 U.S.P.Q. 124, 130 (E.D. Mi. 1979) (no monopoly on pedagogical technique
involved in management training program); Seltzer v. Sunbrock, 22 F. Supp. 621 (S.D. Cal.
1938) (system for conducting roller skating races). See generally Pamela Samuelson, Com-
puter Programs, User Interfaces, and Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976: A Critique
of Lotus v. Paperback, 6 High Tech. L.J. 209, 226-27 & n.73 (1992).
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blueprint does not extend to the useful article portrayed. Thus, it does
not infringe to copy a functional work like a three - dimensional boiler,
lamp, or dress,'14 even though the reverse engineering of any complex
product normally involves making intermediate two-dimensional designs
based on the product being copied. 15 These cases stress the importance
of insuring that copyright, with its low threshold of eligibility for protec-
tion, does not displace the more stringent requirements for protection of
functional works under patent law.' 6 Moreover, even exact copying of
graphic forms has been permitted when the form was designed to inter-
operate with a physical instrument calibrated in a way that rendered sub-
stitute expression of the form impossible (if the user were to have correct
readings of the quantity being measured).' 7
It is therefore not surprising that copyright in a single, traditional
work has rarely raised serious questions under the antitrust laws or even
a strong argument for copyright misuse. Digital technologies, coupled
with our decision to bring computer programs under the protective um-
brella of copyright, change all that. Products of technology, unlike
novels or even music, are used and reused as tools to accomplish work in
14 See, e.g., Combustion Engineering, Inc. v. Murray Tube Works, Inc., 222 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 239, 244 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (boiler manufacture using plaintiffs detailed drawings);
Kashins v. Lightmakers, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (lamps made from a study of
illustrations in plaintiff's copyrighted catalogue do not infringe, nor does an independently
prepared catalogue showing defendant's lamps); Fulmer v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 1021
(Ct. Cl. 1952) (parachutes produced from plaintiff's design); Muller v. Triborough Bridge
Authority, 43 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (no copyright remedy even if defendant used
plaintiff's copyrighted drawing in designing and constructing a bridge approach); Jack Adel-
man, Inc. v. Sonner's & Gordon, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (dress design docu-
ment does not prohibit making a dress based on it). Prior to the Architectural Works
Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VII, 104 Stat. 5133 (1990), the same prin-
ciple was well established for buildings, namely, that copying architectural plans was infringe-
ment but constructing the building depicted in the plans was not. See, e.g., Demetriades v.
Kaufman, 680 F. Supp. 658, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
15 See Sega Amicus Brief, supra note 8, at 19-20, 33 JTUMm-mCS J. at 157 (the primary
author of this portion of the brief was Professor Reichman). When new designs are drawn up
based on the copyright-unprotected three-dimensional product, they are likely to be substan-
tially similar to, and indirectly taken from, the plaintiff's copyright-protected design
documents.
16 See Reichman, Applied Scientific Know-How, supra note 8, at 692. Baker itself em-
phasized this point:
To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art described therein,
when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a sur-
prise and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of letters - patent, not of
copyright.
101 U.S. at 102.
17 See Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 322
U.S. 801; Taylor Instr. Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 785 (1944); but see Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F.
Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (holding that a test answer sheet designed to be read by an optical
scanner was copyright protected).
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the physical world. Computer software is such a technological product;
it is used repeatedly as a tool to accomplish useful results. Technologies
invariably raise questions of efficiency and compatibility.H8 While most
novels may follow one of a few basic structural forms, the detailed story
line of one novel does not depend on nor is it intended to improve upon
that of an existing novel. Technology, however, develops by incremental
improvement. If a given improvement is sufficiently creative ("nonobvi-
ous"), its inventor may be entitled to a 20-year patent upon compliance
with the stringent formal and substantive requirements for patent protec-
tion. If no patent is obtained, the inventor has a monopoly position only
for the lead time required for competitors to recognize the value of the
invention and incorporate it into their own competitive products. And
even if a patent issues, its scope is limited to its precise claims and their
equivalents.19
Now, however, we have a technological product that is protected by
the more lenient copyright regime, with its much longer term and more
vague scope of protection.20 Copyright was not designed for the protec-
tion of functional works of technology. 21 Thus, we fundamentally
18 See Dennis S. Karijala, Copyright, Computer Software, and the New Protectionism, 28
JURIMETRIcS J. 33, 38-40 (1987) [hereinafter New Protectionism].
19 If a patent does issue, it is in important ways stronger than a copyright. The reverse
doctrine of equivalents is reminiscent of the copyright doctrine of fair use, in that it may
supply a defense to literal infringement when a second comer radically improves the underly-
ing product. However, it is rarely applied and differs from fair use in important ways. See
Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEx. L.
REv. 989, 1010-13, 1024-29 (1997). Patents are also stronger in that a patent protects even
against independent invention of the same product, whereas a copyright does not. See, e.g.,
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2nd Cir. 1951). It is impossi-
ble, however, independently to create compatible operating software. At a minimum, the crea-
tor of the compatible system would have to be aware of what she was trying to clone and of
the full panoply of the target system's input/output responses (its specifications). This would
not be independent creation under copyright law, which holds even unconscious copiers liable
for infringement. See Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp, 177,
180 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Indeed, independent creation of any complex work, whether a tradi-
tional work of literature or a modem product of digital technology, is utterly improbable. We
simply would not believe anyone who claimed independently to have re-created Keats' Ode on
a Grecian Urn, notwithstanding Judge Learned Hand's oft-cited use of that example. See
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2nd Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298
U.S. 669; see Donald S. Chisum & Michael A. Jacobs, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY LAW' 4C[5][a] (1999 reprint), at 4-88 (stating that "[i]ndependent creation of a complex,
fanciful work, such as Keats' Ode, is not probable").
20 On the question of the relative scope of software copyrights versus patents, see Dennis
S. Karala, The Relative Roles of Patent and Copyright in the Protection of Computer Pro-
grams, 17 J. MARsHALL I. COMp. & IreFo. L. 41, 45 n.8 (1998) [hereinafter Relative Roles].
21 Most works of copyright subject matter are nonfunctional in the sense that distin-
guishes patent from copyright, because they do no more than supply information or portray an
appearance to human observers. Thus, recipe books, dictionaries, maps, and even code books
are not functional in this important sense. See Dennis S. Karala, A Coherent Theory for the
Copyright Protection of Computer Software and Recent Judicial Interpretations, 66 U. CIN. L.
REv. 53, 56-66 (1997) [hereinafter A Coherent Theory]. On the other hand, some traditional
1999] COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF OPERATING SoFrwARE 169
changed the intellectual property landscape when we decided to place
computer programs under the copyright umbrella. The spate of lawsuits
alleging copyright misuse in computer program cases, and new concerns
about the abuse of market power in connection with computer program
copyrights, should have been expected, even predicted. Network effects
compound the social policy difficulties associated with the copyright pro-
tection of operating software.22 When efficiency or compatibility advan-
tages operate to reduce the traditional opportunities for incremental
improvement or give the dominant market participant a virtual monopoly
not only in the protected program itself but in all other programs and
devices (usually created by third parties) that are designed to be compati-
ble with it, something has to give.
II. APPLICATION PROGRAMS VERSUS OPERATING SYSTEMS
Notwithstanding increasing blurriness at the border, it remains con-
venient for most legal purposes to divide the software universe into ap-
plication programs and operating systems. An operating system is
essentially a layer of platform software designed for particular hardware
and presenting an interface to the user (including the application
programmer) that permits the more convenient writing or using of appli-
cation programs. Application programs are those that perform the ulti-
mate tasks desired by users, such as word processing or video games.
While applications are increasingly bundled into, for example, the domi-
nant Windows operating system of Microsoft, as a practical matter there
are hundreds of "pure" application programs that run only on Windows.
It is the need for that extra layer between application programs and the
copyright-protected works, such as legal forms and standardized test questions, are truly func-
tional in this sense. They accomplish a utilitarian function other than simply to convey infor-
mation or portray an appearance to human beings. See Karjala, supra note 10, at 920-26. In
the case of legal forms, courts have addressed the problems of efficiency and compatibility by
recognizing an extremely narrow scope of protection. See Continental Casualty Co. v. Beards-
ley, 253 F.2d 702 (2nd Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958); see also supra notes 8-10
and accompanying text. In the case of standardized test questions, courts seem not to have
realized that they are dealing with a truly functional work. (Everyone would agree that a syr-
inge for extracting blood for testing is functional. Standardized tests are works that seek to
measure intelligence or psychological makeup by probing with words rather than with need-
les.). At least there is no explicit recognition of this in the opinions. See Applied Innovations,
Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minnesota, 876 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1989) (standardized psychol-
ogy test questions held copyright protectible); Educational Testing Serv. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d
533 (3rd Cir. 1986) (Scholastic Aptitude Test questions held copyright protectible). Perhaps
the economic stakes are not sufficiently high in the highly specialized world of standardized
tests that the issue of the appropriate scope of copyright protection for such functional works
has been litigated to the extent necessary to bring out all of the social policy factors.
22 For a discussion of network effects, see infra notes 33-46 and accompanying text.
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hardware that justifies continued use of the term "operating system" in
connection with programs like Windows. 23
Application programs, no less than operating software, involve
questions of technological efficiency and compatibility with other
software or hardware with which they are designed to interoperate or
with the needs and desires of their human users.24 The potential for un-
due market power from copyright protection has been muted for applica-
tion programs, however, by judicial interpretation. Technological
efficiencies arising from program structure, for example, are filtered out
of the copyright analysis before the substantial similarity analysis for in-
fringement begins.25 Moreover, intermediate copying of programs is a
permissible fair use when effected for the purpose of extracting copy-
right-unprotected elements from the otherwise unintelligible electronic
object code in which programs are distributed.26 Without this interpreta-
tion by the courts, we may have seen more claims of copyright misuse -
using the copyright in the object-code form of the program to withhold
from competitors copyright-unprotected information necessary to com-
pete in the market for compatible programs.27 Finally, while the scope-
of-protection problem in user interfaces remains a matter of some debate,
the leading case has decided that functional aspects of interfaces are un-
protected methods of operation under section 102(b). 28 Consequently,
23 Sun Microsystems' Java technology is not, in itself, an operating system. Its primary
component is rather an interface language (Sun would like it to become the universal interface
language) that will run on any computer whose operating system has the necessary compiler
and related components to translate commands written in Java into binary electronic instruc-
tions for that particular computer. It is perhaps aptly described as a "meta-operating system."
See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Could Java change everything? The competitive
propriety of a proprietary standard, 43 ANTrRusT BuLL. 715, 751-52 (1998) [hereinafter
Could Java change everything?]. If the interface language is and remains universal (or stan-
dard), any program written in that language will run on any computer. Again, then, the dis-
tinction between the application programs written in the Java language and the compilers and
operating system programs that accept Java as an input and translate it into executable code for
specific machines seems reasonably clear, at least conceptually. For a judicial explication of
the Java technology, see Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1109,
1112-17 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (discussing the Java licensing agreement between Sun and
Microsoft), rev'd on other grounds 188 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1999).
24 See Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application
Programs, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1045, 1066-71 (1989) (discussing the role of standardization and
user friendliness in determining the scope of protection in computer-human interfaces).
25 See Computer Associates Inter'l Inc. v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 707 (2nd Cir. 1992)
(adopting the "abstraction, filtration, comparison" test for determining the protected nonliteral
elements of a computer program).
26 See Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992),
amended by Order and Amended Opinion, D.C. No. (CV-91-3871-BAC), Jan. 6, 1993.
27 On facts similar to those in Sega, the claim was made in Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 845-46 (Fed. Cir. 1992); however, the court declined
to decide it on the ground of unclean hands.
28 See Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Inter'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir.
1995), affid by an equally divided court, 116 S. Ct. 804, 133 L. Ed. 2d 610 (1996); but see
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there appears to be no urgency in adapting antitrust law, or perhaps even
the doctrine of copyright misuse, to insure competitive markets in appli-
cations software.
While the narrow interpretations of the scope of program copyrights
apply to operating software as well as applications programs, operating
systems have characteristics that may require special attention. That is
the subject of the next section.
III. COPYRIGHT AND THE PROTECTION OF
OPERATING SOFTWARE
A. Ti EARLY DEVELOPMENT
Our failure to consider carefully the ramifications of protecting
technology with copyright and to distinguish between the various forms
of program technology has brought about a new state of affairs in which
important intellectual property monopolies in software technology de-
pend heavily on copyright. Professor Samuelson's seminal article, point-
ing out the inadequacies of the CONTU Report29 and arguing eloquently
for sui generis legislation, did not appear until 1984, some 4 years after
CONTU's recommendation to rely on copyright was adopted by Con-
gress.30 Moreover, by that time case law had already established that we
would not distinguish between application programs and operating
software in applying the congressional directive to protect computer pro-
grams under copyright. 31 And, in any event, to leave operating software
Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1372 (10th Cir. 1997) (upholding a determination of
noninfringement but declining to adopt the Lotus approach to section 102(b)). In view of the
Supreme Court's even division in Lotus, there is perhaps a touch of wishful thinking in my
characterization of Lotus as the "leading case" on interface protection. In any event, I regard
Lotus as correctly decided and correctly reasoned. See A Coherent Theory, supra note 21, at
94-110.
29 The National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyright Works (CONTU)
was established by Congress "to assist the President and Congress in developing a national
policy for protecting both the rights of copyright owners and insuring public access to copy-
righted works when they are used in computer ... systems, bearing in mind the public and
consumer interest." Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyright Works 3 (1978) [hereinafter "CONTU Report"].
30 Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for
Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DuKE L.J. 663.
31 See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249-54 (3rd
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). The defendant in Franklin argued that an
operating system was an unprotectible system or method of operation under section 102(b) of
the Copyright Act, and the court correctly held that operating software did not differ from
applications software in this regard. Id. at 1252. Moreover, the defendant had made essen-
tially a verbatim copy of the protected program, so again the court was correct in rejecting the
argument that the idea/expression distinction absolved the defendant from infringement liabil-
ity. Id. at 1252-54. If verbatim copying of object code is not infringement, Congress's attempt
to protect computer programs under copyright would become meaningless. Indeed, it is the
protection of literal code against misappropriative copying that supplies the primary basis for
172 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PuBLIc POLICY [Vol. 9:161
outside the umbrella of copyright protection would, in the absence of
additional legislation, arguably have left the bulk of the world's operat-
ing systems without any intellectual property protection at all, not even
protection against verbatim electronic copying for sale in competition
with the creator of the software. 32
Therefore, given that copyright is to protect computer programs, the
existing law and at least some social policy analysis argue for treating
application programs and operating software the same. Still, as the dom-
inant position of Windows in the personal computing market dramati-
cally illustrates, important differences remain between the two types of
computer programs that might call for differences in regulatory treat-
turning to copyright for the protection of this technology in the first place. See, e.g., A Coher-
ent Theory, supra note 21, at 67.
The defendant in Franklin failed to make the one argument that might have had some
chance of success - if not before that particular court, at least before a court that was aware of
some of the problems of protecting computer programs under copyright and willing to tune the
scope of protection to align it better with underlying social policy. Under the United States
Copyright Act, a computer program is "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or
indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1998)
(definition of "computer program"). Both operating systems and application programs consist
of statements or instructions, but the term "computer" in the statutory definition is undefined.
An application program fits neatly into this definition, because it brings about the "certain
result" of word processing, spreadsheet operations, or the like. But what is the "certain result"
brought about by operating software? Indeed, even an application program used with operat-
ing software for which it is not designed will not bring about its "certain result." It would
therefore not be too great a stretch of language to interpret the term "computer" in the statutory
definition to include the hardware plus a given operating system. It is that combination that
renders the technology conveniently available to users to achieve the results they desire. See
supra note 23 and accompanying text. Under this approach, the same hardware would become
a different "computer" when used with different operating software. Operating software would
then simply be a machine part - part of a "computer"and not a "computer program" under the
Act.
32 Patents are increasingly available for software. The PTO's 1996 Guidelines have
largely eliminated the metaphysical subject matter inquiry from the analysis, by treating any
medium embedded with a computer program as an"article of manufacture." See Examination
Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478 (1996); Relative Roles, supra
note 20, at 43. More recently, the Federal Circuit in State Street Bank has eliminated the
"business methods" exception to patentability. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Leo J. Raskind, The State
Street Decision: The Bad Business of Unlimited Patent Protection for Methods of Doing Busi-
ness, 10 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 61 (1999). We can expect a flood of patent
applications claiming computerized versions of doing business, especially on the Internet.
Nevertheless, properly interpreted, the patent in a computer program (as opposed to a patent in
a computer-related invention independent of the specific program that implements the inven-
tion) will not cover the entire program but rather only new and nonobvious programming
methodologies that enhance computer-use technology. See Relative Roles, supra note 20, at
57-69. Many programs today contain no patentable elements at all. For the others only the
patented elements are covered, such as a particular structure or algorithm. In both cases, the
unpatented elements would remain free for fast, cheap, and easy taking but for the program
copyright.
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ment. The most important difference is the extent to which network ef-
fects enter the economic analysis.
B. NETWORK EFFECTS
Economists have developed theories of network effects (or "net-
work externalities") to account for the extent to which consumer value in
a product derives not from the intrinsic functionality or quality of the
product itself but from the fact that a large number of other persons (i.e.,
a network) use the same or a compatible product. 33 All programs,
whether application program or operating software, potentially benefit
from network effects through their user interfaces: The more users there
are of a given program, the easier it is for each user to exchange files
with friends and coworkers, to ask advice on using the program and fix-
ing problems, or to change jobs without having to retrain. For applica-
tion programs, however, especially as long as functional aspects of user
interfaces are deemed copyright-unprotected methods of operation, 34 en-
try barriers do not seem too high for application programmers who seek
to emulate the performance of popular programs whose user interfaces
may involve elements that benefit from user "lock in."' 35 They simply
need write independent code that brings about the same "certain result"
with respect to functional input/output devices.
When network effects are present, however, the market has a ten-
dency to "tip" in the direction of whatever firm gains an initial edge.36
Stronger network effects can be expected in connection with operating
33 Recently, Professors Mark Lemley and David McGowan have published a thorough
analysis of the implications of network theories for various areas of law, including intellectual
property law. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Eco-
nomic Effects, 86 CALi. L. Rnv. 479 (1998) [hereinafter Network Economic Effects]. For a
general description of network effects, see id. at 483-84. These same authors have also applied
network theory specifically to operating software in the Windows and Java context. See Could
Java change everything? supra note 23. Professor Peter Menell has carefully analyzed how
network features should affect the level of copyright protection for protocols and interface
specifications as well as logical systems for structuring tasks to be performed on a computer
via a computer-user interface. See Peter S. Menell, An epitaph for traditional copyright pro-
tection of network features of computer software, 43 ANrTRusT-BuLL. 651 (1998) [hereinafter
Network Features]. Professor Menell was among the first to apply network economics specifi-
cally to the legal analysis of program protection. See Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protec-
tion for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. Rnv. 1329, 1340-45 (1987). Network effects and
possible "tipping" of the market in favor of one participant are discussed in another case
involving Microsoft, where the workstation and server markets were at issue. See Bristol
Technology, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 42 F. Supp. 2d 153, 169, 171 (D. Conn. 1998) (evidence
did not support the conclusion that these markets "tipped" in the direction of Microsoft).
34 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
35 User "lock in" is a noneconomist's word for user psychology that resists retraining to
learn new methods of operation for accomplishing the same function with a computer. See
New Protectionism, supra note 18, at 44-48, 69-71.
36 See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J.
ECON. PERSP. 93, 105-06 (1994).
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systems than with applications software. 37 As long as the technology is
comprised of software layers running in tandem, as has been the case up
to now, network effects should tend to bring one basic operating system
to the fore. Most consumers want computers that perform applications
and are likely to buy computers that give them the applications they
need. In general, when other things are equal, they will buy the operat-
ing system that runs the most applications. Third-party programmers
also do not write programs for the "best" operating system in some ab-
stract sense. Rather, they write programs that they hope consumers will
buy, which means programs written for the most popular operating sys-
tem. These two mutually reinforcing effects eventually are likely to
snowball into a single dominant operating system and high entry barriers
for designers of competing but incompatible systems.38
We should expect that technology will develop neither as rapidly
nor as efficiently when only one company is in a position to modify and
improve upon the existing base. We are more likely to develop solutions
to problems when many people work in an "open" environment than if
all rights to make incremental improvement are held by a single com-
pany, even a giant like Microsoft, whose benevolence for present pur-
poses we may assume.39 No matter how good its intentions, such a
37 See Network Economic Effects, supra note 33, at 492.
38 See id. at 501-02. Again, a noneconomist's approach to this problem can be expressed
in terms of compatibility with third-party programs. Unless competitors can enter the market
with operating systems that, with near 100% reliance, will run applications written for the
dominant operating system, the monopoly in the operating software itself is extended to a
monopoly on all application programs that are designed to run in tandem with it. See New
Protectionism, supra note 18, at 63-65.
Interestingly, the same problem nearly arose with respect to personal computer hardware.
When the IBM PC was first introduced, IBM claimed proprietary rights in its BIOS, the basic
input output system. This BIOS was a layer of operating software that was more fundamental
than even Microsoft's MS-DOS, which ran "on top" of the BIOS. Had the IBM BIOS not
been reverse engineered, IBM would have had a monopoly in all the hardware that could run
programs written for MS-DOS, through its copyright in the BIOS. Fortunately, IBM's BIOS
was sufficiently simple that Phoenix Technologies was able to clone it through "clean room"
procedures, insulating it from an IBM charge of copyright infringement. See James Langdell,
Phoenix Says Its BIOS May Foil IBM's Lawsuits, PC NEws, July 10, 1984, at 56; see also Net-
work Features, supra note 33, at 660, 667. (Apparently, IBM never brought an action assert-
ing that replication of its BIOS interface infringed even if the competitor's product was written
in independent code. Under the standards of Lotus v. Borland, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995),
such a claim would have lost.) No one can say what the personal computing world would look
like today had IBM been successful at retaining a dominant hardware position through intel-
lectual property rights in a simple but crucial part of the "gateway" software, but it is difficult
to imagine that it would be more competitive in favor of consumers than what we now see.
39 That there is value in allowing broad-scale incremental development in computer
software is suggested by recent reports on the Linux operating system, a variation of UNIX
that reportedly is rapidly growing in popularity for its stability, speed, and power, especially in
the internet server and local-area-network environments. See Joseph Alper, From Army of
Hackers, an Upstart Operating System, 282 ScincE 1976 (Dec. 11, 1998). This program is
not only distributed without charge; following the principles of the open-source software
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dominant rights owner does not have the same incentive to improve that
it would have in a competitive environment, nor can we expect the level
of innovation that we would see in an open environment. 40 These
problems are structural and are present whether or not the holder of the
intellectual property rights in some sense "abuses" its monopoly position.
They are thus not Microsoft dependent; they arise no matter which com-
pany wins the standards or networks effects competition, as long as a
single owner holds proprietary rights in the gateway.41
Professors Lemley and McGowan have pointed to the difficulty of
separating network effects from legitimate competition in an industry
prone to standardization. 42 Moreover, they argue that even if Microsoft's
dominance is derived largely from network effects, those effects are an
inherent part of the market and may not be amenable to correction
through antitrust law. It makes little sense to force more competitors into
a market that operates most efficiently with fewer participants, perhaps
even just one. Finally, they argue that because consumers benefit from
the adoption of standards (one large, standard network is better for con-
sumers than several smaller but mutually incompatible networks), even
the absence of competition after victory by a single company in the stan-
dards competition may leave a net gain for consumers to the extent that
(OSS) movement, the Linux native code is also open to allow users to tinker. One enthusiast
is quoted as saying, "Essentially, you harness the power of millions of users to find problems,
whether they be bugs or just deficiencies, and thousands of programmers to fix them quickly."
Id. at 1977. Even a Microsoft product manager is quoted as saying, "The ability of the OSS
process to collect and harness the collective IQ of thousands of individuals across the Internet
is simply amazing." Id. Like other forms of UNIX operating software, Linux apparently still
suffers from complexities and user-unfriendliness that render it intimidating to the average
user. However, the OSS movement is now working on a project called GNOME that may
make it more acceptable to the technologically challenged (which group includes the author of
this article). For a general discussion of these developments, see Charles C. Mann, Programs
to the People, TECHNOLOGY REvmw, January/February 1999, at 36.
Professor Lemley has pointed out to me that open standards can result in slower develop-
ment if a large number of players must coordinate their activities. It seems to me that this
addresses another aspect of the network problem. That is, open standards can result in frag-
mentation into a set of mutually incompatible systems, with the result that many of the net-
work benefits are lost, perhaps to such an extent that the losses overshadow the gains in
innovation that follow from open standards. The market, however, is not unaware of the bene-
fits of compatible networks and, indeed, we should expect that sooner or later the market will
"tip" in the direction of a single standard for that reason. Innovations that do not preserve
compatibility are unlikely to make much headway, and even if they do, in an open-standards
environment anyone can adopt the new standard for continued innovation.
40 Network Features, supra note 33, at 674.
41 Cf. Could Java change everything?, supra note 23, at 728 ("The risk of welfare loss
due to ownership of an important standard in potentially bottlenecking technology is constant;
the variable is merely which firm owns the standard").
42 Network Economic Effects, supra note 33, at 502, 595-96.
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the social welfare benefits of the larger network outweigh the anticompe-
titive effects of standardization.43
Professors Lemley and McGowan, however, seem largely to be tak-
ing Microsoft's intellectual property rights, in particular, its copyrights in
the Windows software, for granted.44 If it is true that the operating sys-
tem market would gravitate toward a single dominant system, and if as a
result traditional antitrust remedies could not keep the market open to
competition in the long run,45 it remains likely that incremental improve-
ment of the dominant system would occur more efficiently under an open
system environment (limited or no proprietary rights) than under the cur-
rent system of copyright protection. Even if a net social benefit accom-
panies the winning of a standards competition by a single company,
because the positive network effects outweigh the losses from inferior
products, an even greater social benefit might accrue if the dominant
company's advantage in improving its product and in building compati-
ble products, resulting from its copyrights, is reduced.46
43 See id. at 501-07; see also Could Java change everything?, supra note 23, at 723.
44 This is not intended as a criticism of the Lemley and McGowan work. All analysis
must start somewhere, and their primary focus is the role of network theory in antitrust.
Within that context, they assume that copyright is rationally based on supplying a supracompe-
titive return as an incentive to investment. Could Java change everything?, supra note 23, at
748. They explicitly leave open the possibility of using network theory in the design of the
intellectual property system itself. See id. at 748-49 n.81 ("We are only arguing here that once
the proper level of intellectual property protection has been determined, antitrust should be
loath to intrude upon that determination."). Indeed, these authors suggest some normative
content to intellectual property rights in network markets along with their economic analysis.
For example, they argue in favor of reverse engineering rights both for the purpose of making
compatible products and where reverse engineering promotes compatibility with an industry
standard. See Network Economic Effects, supra note 33, at 523-27. They also apply network
theory to analyze the scope of copyright protection in program interfaces. See id. at 531-37.
Moreover, they offer possible reasons to explain why no one has succeeded in cloning
Microsoft's Windows software, given that copyright law today does permit reverse engineer-
ing for these purposes. They suggest a combination of collateral legal rules (those affecting
shrinkwrap licenses and patents, which are not subject to legal reverse engineering), the diffi-
culty of achieving 100% compatibility through independent coding, periodic updates by
Microsoft that would render a competitor incompatible, and Microsoft's pricing policy (which
may hold profits low enough to scare off potential competitors). See id. at 527-30. Cf. Now
Bust Microsoft's Trust, ECONoiST, Nov. 13, 1999 (pointing out that even IBM, after spending
a fortune trying to be Windows compatible, could not convince consumers that IBM's operat-
ing system could run a critical mass of Windows applications, and Microsoft was always able
to stay one jump ahead).
45 See Network Economic Effects, supra note 33, at 502. Professor Priest has strongly
criticized Judge Jackson's initial findings in part for failing to take into account the beneficial
effects of networks. See George L. Priest, A Feeble Case, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1999, at A50.
He, too, seems to assume that the scope and strength of Microsoft's copyrights are not on the
table for discussion.
46 Professor Lemley has pointed out to me that this argument, too, is predicated on an
assumption that the dominant operating system has been created and offered to the public. If
we are to change the rules of intellectual property protection, we must consider the reduced
incentives that less protection for operating software will engender. Without intellectual prop-
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IV. REFORMULATE COPYRIGHT?
The discussion in the previous section brings us to the crux of the
matter: If copyright protection of software, or of operating systems, is the
problem, is that problem not solved by reformulating copyright to ac-
commodate better the needs of the digital age?47
In principle, it is difficult to argue with this logic. Maybe it is time
to follow Professor Samuelson's recommendation to adopt sui generis
legislation aimed specifically at the intellectual property protection of
computer programs. 48 Were we to do so, we could tailor the statutory
protection to the special characteristics of particular kinds of programs
and industries so as to optimize the social policy balances. 49 Unfortu-
nately, it seems too late in the day to take this eminently sensible ap-
erty rights that internalize costs and benefits of costly innovation, coordination problems might
result in a relatively stagnant standard. See Could Java change everything?, supra note 23, at
73 1. The question, however, is not whether to supply an incentive through protection as intel-
lectual property but rather the scope of such protection. Operating software is nontraditional
copyright subject matter and, indeed, technological subject matter. See supra notes 18-21 and
accompanying text. I therefore see no reason for assuming a priori that the rules of traditional
copyright should be given any special weight in determining the level of protection that will
most closely optimize incentives. The example of Linux suggests that the strong protection
offered by traditional copyright may be more than necessary to supply an incentive to produce
operating software. Ultimately, we need an analysis based on the specifics of the software
industry, and operating software in particular. At least two recent studies suggest that healthier
innovation in software technology occurs when information is treated not as property vulnera-
ble to misappropriation but rather as a resource that grows incrementally through the contribu-
tions and interactions of many participants. See Gillian C. Dempsey, Knowledge and
Inmovation in Intellectual Property: The Case of Computer Program Copyright, Ph.D. thesis,
Australian National University (March 1998) (copy on file with the author); AnnaLee Sax-
enian, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND RouTE
128 (1994); see also Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of Computer Program Structure,
64 BROOK. L. REv. 519, 536-38 & n.60 (1998).
47 See Thomas F. Cotter, Intellectual property and the essential facilities doctrine, 44
ANTITRusT BuLL. 211, 248, 250 (Spring 1999).
48 See Pamela Samuelson, supra note 30; Pamela Samuelson, Creating a New Kind of
Intellectual Property: Applying the Lessons of the Chip Law to Computer Programs, 70 MINN.
L. REv. 471 (1985).
49 Cf Pamela Samuelson et. al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Com-
puter Programs, 94 COLTJM L. REv. 2308, 2420-29 (1994). These authors are primarily inter-
ested in what they perceive to be too little protection under current intellectual property law for
computer software, namely, for those elements of computer programs beyond literal code that
either now or in the future will be subject to "market failure"--fast and easy cloning of ele-
ments that are costly to create in the first instance. Consequently, their scheme would appar-
ently supplement the copyright protection in computer programs, although they call for
reconsideration of program patents. See id at 2424. I have suggested that, if we are seeking an
exclusive sui generis regime, we could do well to start with this concept of market failure, or
misappropriation, but to focus on copying methods that are responsible for the market failure
rather than seek to identify explicit types of subject matter that should be taken out of the
patent and copyright regimes into the new paradigm. See Dennis S. Karjala, Misappropriation
as a Third hztellectual Property Paradigm, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2594 (1994).
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proach. The TRIPS Agreement5° has solidified the treatment of
computer programs internationally as literary works under copyright
law5' at the insistence of developed countries, including the United
States.52 Indeed, when Japan announced that it had appointed a commis-
sion to consider adopting an explicit provision on reverse engineering to
harmonize its copyright law with that of the European Union 53 and the
United States,54 the howls of complaint from the United States trade
negotiators were so strident that the Japanese backed down.55 One can
only imagine the uproar that would ensue from a proposal to limit copy-
right protection in operating software, from which Microsoft derives so
much international trade revenue.
More generally, the domestic politics of copyright have reached the
stage at which legislative retrenchment in the length, breadth, or strength
of copyright law is nearly impossible. Professor Litman has written ex-
tensively on the process by which copyright legislation is adopted.56
50 Annex JC, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in
FINAL TEXTS OF THE GAT URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS INCLUDING THE AGREErMEN Es-
TABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AS SIGNED ON APRIL. 15, 1994, MARAKESH
MOROCCO 319-52 (Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the
President, Washington D.C. 1994).
51 Article 10(1) of the TRIPS Agreement states that "[c]omputer programs, whether in
source or object code, shall be protected as literary works under the Berne Convention
(1971)." The December 1996 treaty adopted under the auspices of the World Intellectual
Property Organization also provides, "Computer programs are protected as literary works
within the meaning of Article 2 of the Berne Convention. Such protection applies to computer
programs, whatever may be the mode or form of their expression." WIPO Copyright Treaty,
Adopted by the Diplomatic Conference on December 20, 1996, Art. 4, available at <http://
www.dfc.org/history/international/treaty0l.html>(visited April 17, 2000).
52 J.H. Reichman, The Know-How Gap in the TRIPS Agreement: Why Softvare Fared
Badly, and What Are the Solutions, 17 HASTINGS Comm. & ENT. L.J. 763, 774-75, 783 (1995).
53 Directive 91/250, art. 6, 1991 O.J. (L. 122) 42 (permitting decompilation of computer
programs to the extent necessary to achieve interoperability).
54 Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that inter-
mediate copying of a program in object-code form is a fair use when effected for the extracting
of unprotected elements, provided no copyright-protected elements are used in creating a new
program), amended by Order and Amended Opinion, D.C. No. CV-91-3871-BAC, Jan. 6,
1993.
55 Betsy E. Bayha, Reverse Engineering of Computer Softvare in the United States, the
European Union, and Japan, in ANTI/INrELLECrUAL PROPERTY CLAIMS IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY
MARKETS, C137 ALI-ABA 175, 190-91 (American Law Institute - American Bar Association
Continuing Legal Education, January 26, 1995). Professors Reichman and Samuelson have
suggested that United States trade negotiators may be following a "digital agenda" that sacri-,
fices the public interest in balanced intellectual property laws for the benefit of private inter-
ests of right owners. See J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in
Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 109-13 (1997); see also Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital
Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369 (1997).
56 Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. Rv.
857 (1987) [hereinafter Copyright, Compromise]; see also Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright
Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. Rnv. 19 (1996) [hereinafter Revising Copyright Law];
Jessica Litman, Copyright and Information Policy, 55 L. & CoNTEMP'. PRODS. 185 (1992)
[hereinafter Copyright and Information]; Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J.
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Congress has largely abdicated its constitutional role as drafter of copy-
right statutes and acts primarily as middleman, enacting into statutory
law whatever compromises are reached among the various interest
groups that, at that particular time, have copyright concerns. The result
of this process is a statute with broad and increasingly powerful general
rights, limited by narrow exemptions carved out of the general rights by
interest groups with enough political clout to stop the bill unless they get
their way.57 A fundamental problem with this method of legislating is
that interest groups that do not yet realize how or even that they will be
affected (perhaps because the technology that would define their interest
has not yet been invented) are unrepresented. 58 More importantly, the
public interest in a balance between owners' and users' rights that maxi-
mizes the interest of society in a vibrant and expanding public domain on
which future authors can build new works is almost wholly unrepre-
sented in this process. 59
Moreover, copyright has become so complex that few members of
Congress have much interest, let alone understanding, of its basic princi-
ples or how it works. Copyright legislation starts out in the Judiciary
Committees (in the case of the House, the Subcommittee on Courts and
Intellectual Property). The repeat players in the copyright legislation
965 (1990); Jessica Litman Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REv.
275 (1989) [hereinafter Copyright Legislation].
57 See Copyright, Compromise, supra note 56, at 883 ("The [1976 Act] granted authors
expansive rights covering any conceivable present and future uses of copyrighted works, and
defined those uses very broadly. It then provided specific, detailed exemptions for those inter-
ests whose representatives had the bargaining power to negotiate them."); Copyright Legisla-
tion, supra note 56, at 281 (strategy arising out of negotiations on the 1976 Act "granted
broad, expansive rights, including future as well as currently feasible uses of copyrighted
works. Each of the copyright users represented in the negotiations, meanwhile, received the
benefit of a privilege or exemption specifically tailored to its requirements, but very narrowly
defined.").
58 See Copyright Legislation, supra note 56, at 333 ("The representatives of yet-to-de-
velop technology cannot be present in a bargaining room filled with current stakeholders").
59 See Revising Copyright Law, supra note 56, at 48 ("There are ... few signs that the
entities proposing statutory revision have taken the public's interests very seriously."); Copy-
right and Information, supra note 56, at 205 ("In the rush to enhance American competitive-
ness, Congress has accommodated industry coalitions and yielded to political expediency
without serious consideration of the implications of restricting the public's access to the con-
tents of copyrighted works."); Copyright Legislation, supra note 56, at 312 ("Although a few
organizations showed up at the conferences purporting to represent the 'public' with respect to
narrow issues, the citizenry's interest in copyright and copyrighted works was too varied and
complex to be amenable to interest group championship. Moreover, the public's interests were
not somehow approximated by the push and shove among opposing industry representatives.
To say that the affected industries represented diverse and opposing interests is not to say that
all relevant interests were represented."). Cf. William F. Patry, Copyright and the Legislative
Process: A Personal Perspective, 14 CAnRDozo ARTs & ENTrr. L.J. 139, 145 (1996) ("Copyright
legislation is... about money and not principles. As a result, those with the most money are
the best organized and represented .... The interests of individual authors, who are rarely
well-organized, get trampled in the process.").
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game - the publishing and entertainment industries, for example - fully
understand the committee system and how to get their views across to
committee members. And it is in the House Subcommittee and the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee that copyright legislation is adopted. In the
House, the full Judiciary Committee usually rubber-stamps the action of
the Subcommittee and the bill goes to the floor under rules prohibiting
amendments. 60
In the Senate, copyright legislation is usually called up under a pro-
cedure that requires unanimous consent. 61 One would think that this
would allow the public interest at least to get a hearing, on the theory that
there must be at least one Senator willing to take the time to understand
the issues and to demand fuller and more open debate. Unfortunately,
that rarely happens. The automatic renewal legislation in 199262 and the
term extension legislation in 199863 drastically reduced the public do-
60 See Patry, supra note 59, at 146. An exception was the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act, which passed the House on March 25, 1998, together with a floor amendment
expanding the exemption from the public performance right for over-the-air music played in
business establishments. See H.R. 2589, 105th Cong. The bill was ultimately adopted as S.
505, 105th Cong. (1998). The amendment was opposed by the copyright protectionists who
control the committees because it limits one of the exclusive rights of copyright. This is a rare
example in which a particular interest group has enough clout in the Congress that it could
hold the wholly unrelated term extension legislation hostage until its own desires were met.
The result was not a victory for the public, however, except in the highly indirect sense that the
cost of doing business for bars and restaurants may decrease slightly. Moreover, a WTO panel
has just issued an interim report finding that these limitations on the public performance right
are inconsistent with U.S. obligations under Article 9(1) of the TRIPS Agreement to comply
with the Berne Convention. See WTO Panel Issues Preliminary Ruling Against U.S. Rules for
Licensing Music, 59 BNA PATENT, TRADEMARK & CoPYRIarr J., No. 1471, at 863 (Apr. 11,
2000).
61 See Patry, supra note 59, at 147.
62 Pub. L. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264 (1992). This statute eliminated the requirement that
the copyright owner take formal renewal action to preserve a pre-1978 copyright, without
which it expired 28 years after publication. A huge cache of works that otherwise would have
been freely available after a relatively short 28-year term thus became protected for 75, and
now 95, years. One can argue that the elimination of this formality for maintaining copyright
protection was required by our treaty obligations under the Berne Convention, but that very
argument exposes the sophisticated level at which copyright protectionist interests have been
operating. In 1989 Congress was convinced that by eliminating the requirement for notice of
copyright on each copy of a work the United States could join and be in compliance with the
Berne Convention. Once the U.S. became a member, these same forces used the Berne Con-
vention to argue that our level of protection was insufficiently strong. See infra note 66. It is
another example of the way copyright protection ratchets only in one direction. Cf. Dennis S.
Karala, United States Adherence to the Berne Convention and Copyright Protection of Infor-
mation-Based Technologies, 28 JuRmm-rcs J. 147 (1988) (arguing that the advent of digital
technology was precisely the wrong time to add the rigidity of Berne to the mix in trying to
achieve the optimal social policy balances for computer programs).
63 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, S. 505, 105th Cong. (1998). The term
extension legislation assures that virtually nothing new will enter the public domain for 20
years. This is the first time in United States history that the country will experience such a no-
growth period in the public domain. (At the time of the previous retroactive term extensions,
including the 19-year extension effected by the 1976 Act, much material continued to fall into
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main, and yet both sailed through Congress virtually unopposed.64 Ar-
chitectural works came under copyright protection in 1990,65 along with
a U.S. version of moral rights.66 Not only does copyright legislation
ratchet solely in the direction of ever longer, stronger, and broader pro-
tection, but the tempo with which rights previously held by the public are
being converted into private property has increased drastically with and
since the adoption of the 1976 Act.
This is not to say that everything desired by copyright and intellec-
tual property protectionists is adopted by Congress. Obviously, many
the public domain as a result of copyright owners' failure to renew their initial 28-year copy-
rights. That avenue to the public domain, however, was closed in 1992.) For more informa-
tion on the term extension legislation and its demerits, visit the "Opposing Copyright
Extension" home page, <http://www.publie.asu.edu/-dkarjala> (visited April 17, 2000).
Harvard Professor Larry Lessig is spearheading a constitutional challenge to the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act, but his arguments were rebuffed by the District Court for the
District of Columbia. An appeal is pending. The documents filed in the case may be viewed
at <http:lcyber.law.harvard.eduleldredvrenollegaldocs.html> (visited April 17, 2000).
64 The public domain was further reduced in 1997, when Congress added section 303(b)
to the Copyright Act, providing that the distribution of phonorecords before 1978 does not
constitute a publication of the underlying musical work recorded. Pub. L. No. 105-80, 111
Stat. 1534 (1997). This means that the failure to attach a copyright notice to the distributed
phonorecords did not cause the underlying musical work to fall into the public domain. See
Mayhew v. Allsup, 166 F.3d 821 (6th Cir. 1999). And in 1994 Congress amended section
104A of the statute as part of the legislation implementing the Uruguay Round of General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. See Pub. L. No. 103-465 ' 514, 108 Stat. 4976 (1994). This
action restored copyright in foreign works that had fallen into the public domain due to failure
to comply with the formalities of copyright notice or renewal. One commentator has argued
that reviving copyrights in this way is constitutional because the Berne Convention provides
for just compensation to the parties. See Tung Yin, Reviving Fallen Copyrights: A Constitu-
tional Analysis of Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, 17 Loy. L.A.
ENr. L.J. 383 (1997). This analysis, however, considers only harms or claimed harms to reli-
ance parties who have exploited works that had fallen into the public domain because of proce-
dural defects. It does not consider the public trust doctrine, under which Congress is
prohibited from giving away public property without just compensation. See Richard A. Ep-
stein, Congress's Copyright Giveaway, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1998, at A19, available at
<http://www.public.asu.edu/-dkarjala/constitutionalitylEpsteinWSJ12-21-98.html> (visited
April 17,'2000).
65 See Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit.
VII, 104 Stat. 5133 (1990). Together with related provisions, this statute added a definition of
"architectural work" to the Copyright Act and specifically included such works in the list of
copyright subject matter. See 17 U.S.C.A. " 101 (definition of "architectural work") &
102(a)(8). Architectural works follow computer programs to constitute the second type of
functional work expressly to be placed under copyright.
66 See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. IV, 104 Stat. 5133
(1990). Legislation creating moral rights and the protection of architectural works won much
of its support from the argument that both were required to meet our commitments under the
Beme Convention, notwithstanding that Congress was told at the time of adherence to Beme
that existing law would leave us in compliance. See Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working
Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 10 COLuM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 513, 547-
57 (1986). The Berne Convention explicitly includes works of architecture in its category of
protected "literary and artistic works." BmN CONVENTION FOR Tm PROTECrION OF LrraR-
ARY AND AnTisnc WoRKs, Art. 2 (Paris Text, 1971).
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proposals to expand intellectual property protection do engender opposi-
tion and at least a degree of compromise among the interested parties.
Nevertheless, once legislation is enacted, retrenchment becomes nearly
impossible, because the same forces that make it difficult to get legisla-
tion passed in the first instance now work in favor of the special interests
whose intellectual property rights are belatedly understood to be stronger
than optimal social policy balancing would call for. Congress may not
be controlled by protectionist interests, notwithstanding the increasing
skill that those interests have shown in getting their programs adopted
into law. But, absent a major crisis of a type that is difficult to imagine,
Congress is institutionally incapable of correcting a legislative error in
recognizing intellectual property protection that is too long, too strong, or
too broad. Therefore, if copyright protection of computer operating
software is the problem, legislative reformulation of copyright is not a
realistic solution.67
V. RESOLVING THE QUANDARY
Assuming that copyright law will not be fixed legislatively, three
possibilities come to mind for dealing with the problem of copyright mo-
nopolies in operating systems. First, we might do nothing and hope that
things work out for the best in the long run. Second, we might ask the
courts to apply copyright doctrine, especially the doctrine of copyright
misuse, to inhibit the copyright monopolist from extending its monopoly
in the protected product to copyright-unprotected products and services.
More generally, we might ask the courts to limit the copyright in operat-
ing systems in ways that more closely implement underlying copyright
policies. Third, we might ask the courts to apply other branches of law
to achieve optimal social policy results. The most natural candidate -
indeed, the only candidate that readily springs to mind - is antitrust.68
67 Professor Lemley has pointed out that there may be a constitutional problem with
reducing copyright protection, in that such a reduction is arguably a "taking" of "property."
68 The Court of Justice of the European Communities has approved the use of antitrust
("competition law") to rein in local recognition of an overly strong copyright. See Radio
Telefis Eireann (RTE) v. Commission of the European Communities, [1995] E.C.R. 1-743,
[1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 718, referred to as the Magill case after one of the private parties seeking
relief. The Court found abuse of a dominant position under Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome
in the refusal of television broadcasters to license the publication of their program listings
more than 1, or occasionally 2, days prior to actual broadcast. The broadcasters argued that
refusal to license, for any reason, was within the traditional rights of a copyright owner; that
the Treaty of Rome under Article 36 did not derogate from the normal exercise of intellectual
property rights; and that therefore a refusal to license could not be an abuse under Article 86.
The logic of this argument is essentially identical to that of Microsoft as owner of the copy-
right in Windows. The problem in Magill was that England and Ireland apparently recognize
copyright protection in some kinds of information, in this case the information contained in the
program listings. As a matter of social policy, recognition of copyright rights in such informa-
tion, at least in the opinion of this author, is fundamentally misguided. In the European Union,
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A. LEAVING THINGS ALONE
Few monopolies last forever, even without legal intervention.69 In-
deed, in the case of operating systems, a challenger to Microsoft is al-
ready on the horizon in the form of Linux. 70 Widespread adoption of
Linux would eliminate the structural problems caused by proprietary op-
erating software,71 because Linux is nonproprietary. Moreover, Sun
Microsystem's Java technology has some potential for eliminating the
need for complex operating systems like Windows.72 While that tech-
nology is proprietary,7 3 Sun claims, at least for the present, to support
open systems.74 To the extent Java is open to incremental improvement
remedial action could in principle have been taken at the Union level, harmonizing E.U. law
and expressly denying copyright in the informational content of program listings. That, how-
ever, is probably no more likely to happen than action by the United States Congress re-
trenching copyright rights once granted. Consequently, the Court had to choose between a
socially undesirable monopoly in supplying weekly television listings and applying antitrust
law to overcome the unduly powerful copyright.
69 For an argument that network effects do not lead to permanently entrenched monopo-
lies, see Mit Spears, The DOJ and the "network effect," UpsInE, Oct. 1998, at 39.
70 For a brief description of Linux, see supra note 39.
71 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
72 According to Ed Zandor, the Chief Operating Office of Sun, instructions written in
Java will execute on any microprocessor independent of the operating system, as long as the
microprocessor can interpret Java. See Richard L. Brandt, Zander, at war with Windows, Up-
siDE, July 1998, at 87, 128 (interview of Edward J. Zander); see also supra note 23 and accom-
panying text.
73 Sun licensed the "Java technology" to Microsoft. See Sun Microsystems, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1998). To the extent Java is simply a
programming language, the commentary has generally concluded that copyright protection is
neither available nor a good idea. See, e.g., Richard H. Stem, Copyright in Computer Pro-
gramming Languages, 17 RurGERS CoMPuTER & TECH. L.J. 321, 378 (1991); Elizabeth G.
Lowry, Note, Copyright Protection for Computer Languages: Creative Incentive or Techno-
logical Threat?, 39 EMORY L.J. 1293, 1349 (1990). More generally, a programming language
is simply an interface between the programmer and the compiler (or interpreter) program that
translates the programmer's source code into lower-level, executable object code. As such, it
is a method of operation that should be denied protection under section 102(b). See Dennis S.
Kaijala, Copyright Protection of Computer Software in the United States and Japan Part 1, 13
Eu. ITnELL. PROP. Rnv. 195, 199-200 (1991). To the extent that Java is an architecture, its
functionality should be denied copyright protection either because it is not copyright subject
matter or, if such architecture constitutes a nonliteral element of a computer program, under
the filtering analysis of Computer Associates Intemat'l Inc. v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 707 (2nd
Cir. 1992). However, individual pieces of Java are undoubtedly computer programs in their
own right and protected at least against verbatim copying. Indeed, Sun's complaint against
Microsoft included a charge of infringement of Sun's source code copyrights for the Java
technology. See Sun Microsystems, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1112. Even a copyright in the imple-
menting computer programs, however, would not legally prohibit a competitor from writing
programs that performed the same function with noninfringing code.
74 Ed Zander, Why Not Java?, UPsimE, October 1998, at 56. Mr. Zander is the Chief
Operating Officer of Sun Microsystems. Cf. Could Java change everything?, supra note 23, at
751 ("While Sun might or might not be a more benevolent monopolist than Microsoft, the real
promise of Java is based on the standard remaining open and offering us the joint benefits of
network effects and intrastandard competition.").
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by persons outside of Sun, the structural problems associated with pro-
prietary operating software, such as a reduced level of innovation, are
less likely to arise after an assumed ultimate displacement of Windows
by Java. Consequently, whatever problems stem from Microsoft's mo-
nopoly over the gateway may be resolved sooner or later in a way that
does not permit the permanent extraction of monopoly rents and achieves
an optimal level of innovation.
Of course, if a new proprietary operating system displaces Win-
dows, we only shift the problem from Microsoft to the new dominant
controller of the gateway. 75 And in any event, we must ask how long it
will take before Microsoft's dominant position is broken by "natural"
forces and whether we are willing to wait that long. Microsoft's foun-
ders and shareholders have received quite extraordinary returns on their
investments and in exchange have given the public a product that few
would claim represents the best that technology could offer.76 If it is true
that open systems software would give the public better products for less
money, it is at least worth considering whether legal intervention could
achieve enough of those public benefits to justify the obvious potential
costs of such intervention (inefficient government regulation or judicial
oversight, for example, or possibly a lower level of incentive for operat-
ing system innovators).
B. REGULATING WMTIN COPYRIGHT-COPYRIGHT MISUSE
The inclusion of computer programs within the categories of copy-
right subject matter has caused the courts to take a new look at the doc-
trine of copyright misuse.77 The first circuit court decision to uphold the
doctrine as a defense to copyright infringement was Lasercomb America,
Inc. v. Reynolds,78 holding that an attempt through contract to extend a
conceded right to prohibit the copying of program code to prevent the
development of noninfringing competing software was a misuse of the
program copyright. Since then, a number of courts, especially in cases
involving computer programs, have considered and upheld the misuse
defense.79
75 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
76 Cf., e.g., Jonathan Littman, Microsoft: running off track?, UPSIDE, June 1998, at 74,
134 ("While [makers of chips, drives, monitors, and printers] have made huge breakthroughs,
PCs are still expensive - and hard to use - largely because of Microsoft's bloated software.").
77 See generally Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Copyright Misuse and the Limits of the Intellec-
tual Property Monopoly, 6 J. I-EL.L. PROP. L. 1 (1998); William E. Thomson Jr. & Margaret
Y. Chu, Overstepping the Bounds: Copyright Misuse, 15 COMPUTER LAW, Nov. 1998, at 1;
Stephen J. Davidson & Nicole A. Engisch, Copyright Misuse and Fraud on the Copyright
Office: An Escape for Infringers?, 13 COMPUTER LAW., July 1996, at 14; Hanna, supra note 7.
78 911 F.2d 970, 978-79 (4th Cir. 1990).
79 See Hanna, supra note 7, at 403 (this defense is raised most often in software cases
and cases involving bundled sales of music or motion picture performance rights). For a table
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Can copyright misuse be successfully asserted against Microsoft? It
certainly could, especially in light of the court's findings that Microsoft
actually did much of what it was accused of,80 whether or not the court
ultimately finds those activities to be an antitrust violation.81 However,
the misuse doctrine remains simply a shield to an infringement action.
No court has yet allowed its use as a sword.82 Although a finding of
abuse would prevent Microsoft from enforcing its copyrights, enforce-
ability would be restored with the end of the abuse. It is unlikely that a
competitor would engage in serious efforts to improve Windows know-
ing that its work could become an enforceable copyright violation essen-
tially at any time. Therefore, the basic question of whether the pace and
direction of innovation can be optimized when only one company con-
trols the right to innovate the dominant system would remain. If the
rights holder in the dominant system is not engaging in copyright abuse,
innovative improvements can only be effected with its permission. And,
almost by its very terms, it is difficult to find copyright misuse if we
assume that the dominant rights owner has not entered into licensing ar-
rangements for its operating software aimed at giving it an advantage in,
for example, applications software designed to run on that operating sys-
tem or otherwise tried to lever that monopoly unfairly onto other prod-
ucts. In other words, copyright misuse does not directly deal with the
structural problems that arise from the combination of strong network
effects and the copyright itself.
of district and circuit court decisions on copyright misuse through about 1995, see Davidson &
Engisch, supra note 77, at 18. Even before Lasercomb, Professor Menell argued that the
functional nature of computer programs and their interfaces justified the development of a
copyright misuse doctrine along the lines of patent misuse. See Peter S. Menell, An Analysis
of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1045, 1102
n.302 (1989). The most recent circuit court decision is Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technolo-
gies, Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999), in which the court upheld a jury determination of
misuse where a program license allowed use only with the copyright owner's hardware, which
indirectly gave control over non-copyright-protected elements.
80 Judge Jackson's findings of fact are available on line from the Government Printing
Office, <http://usvms.gpo.gov>(visited April 17, 2000).
81 The weight of authority and the recent commentary suggest that an antitrust violation
is not necessary to the misuse defense. See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978 (holding that it was
unnecessary to decide the Clayton Act charge because maintenance of the suit was in any
event against public policy in view of the copyright misuse); see also Alcatel USA, 166 F.3d at
784, 795 (upholding both a finding of copyright misuse and the dismissal of the antitrust
counterclaim); Fellmeth, supra note 77, at 38 (arguing that the misuse defense should primar-
ily be a public policy doctrine); Hanna, supra note 7, at 445 (arguing for the development of a
common law of misuse tailored to copyright, not antitrust, policies).
82 Thomson & Chu, supra note 77, at 5 (raising the question of whether misuse can form
the basis for an affirmative claim for an injunction or damages).
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C. REGULATING OUTSIDE COPYRIGHT-ANTITRUST
The obstacles to using the misuse doctrine to solve the structural
problems arising from the copyright in operating software also present
difficulties in the antitrust analysis. For one, antitrust as currently formu-
lated does not provide a remedy unless monopolization or some other
antitrust violation is proved.83 Traditionally, mere exploitation of a stat-
utorily granted intellectual property right does not amount to an antitrust
violation. Moreover, much of the need for the copyright misuse doctrine
comes from the differing policies of copyright and antitrust.84 Now that
misuse has freed itself from antitrust to pursue the public policy goals of
copyright, 85 why should we return to antitrust in the context of operating
systems?
The answer lies in the flexibility of the remedies available. At least
if an antitrust violation is proved, the court has available to it a wide
range of potential remedies, ranging from an injunction against the ille-
gal conduct to compulsory licensing or publication of the program's
source code. The court could even order structural relief, such as sepa-
rating ownership of the operating system rights from rights in application
programs or auctioning off the source code to a number of purchasers
who would then compete.8 6 Neither of these latter approaches is likely
to optimize consumer benefits, however.87 Creating an open system en-
vironment through mandatory publication of source code and all underly-
ing technical data, together with compulsory licensing to allow
incremental improvement by innovators outside of the copyright owner,
is a much better solution that at least addresses the basic structural prob-
lem arising from the network externalities. Compulsory licensing is
anathema to hard-core copyrightists,88 so this remedy is particularly dif-
ficult to reach under a copyright misuse theory.
83 See supra note I and accompanying text.
84 See Hanna, supra note 7, at 435-47 (arguing that antitrust is both too broad and too
narrow to effect policy goals for goods in which technological innovation is crucial).
85 See supra note 81.
86 See Steve Lohr, Calling in Experts to Fix Microsoft if It's Broken, N.Y. TIMs, Feb.
16, 1999, at C7; What Happens to Microsoft if It Loses Antitnst Case?, WALL ST. J., Novem-
ber 16, 1998, at A40.
87 Separating ownership of the operating system from the application program develop-
ers does not deal with the problem of achieving the optimal level of innovation in operating
software, because one company would continue to own exclusive rights in the dominant sys-
tem. Even requiring Microsoft to sell off its operating system rights to a number of purchasers
might not be effective in the long run. The network externalities analysis suggests that the
market is likely to gravitate to one or a small number of operating systems. See Network
Economic Effects, supra note 33, at 502-03; see also supra notes 33-46 and accompanying
text. In that case, competition among the purchasers could lead to one of their number again
becoming dominant, bringing us back to the starting point.
88 Article 13 of the Berne Convention permits compulsory licensing of musical works for
use in phonorecords once an authorized recording has been made, and Article 11 permits
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What we need, then, is a theory that looks to the policies underlying
copyright to determine whether there is a problem and the remedies of
antitrust to fix it. Constructing such a theory is admittedly difficult when
one recalls that the starting point for the analysis was the congressional
incapacity to solve the copyright problem legislatively.8 9 The courts
would have to find that underlying copyright policies of promoting the
public welfare by increasing access to and use of desired works90 are
actually undercut by allowing exploitation of copyright rights in operat-
ing systems to the same extent as allowed for traditional works. 9'
Still, antitrust may be robust enough to allow this approach. Con-
gress has never directly spoken to the copyright protectibility of operat-
ing software. Indeed, Congress has never even addressed the question of
the scope of protection in computer programs generally. 92 At an earlier
stage, the courts could plausibly have determined that operating software
placing conditions on the broadcasting of works, but the Convention does not otherwise au-
thorize compulsory licensing. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, July 24, 1971 Arts. XIII & XI. Indeed, by implication compulsory licensing is prohib-
ited outside these contexts. This conclusion is reinforced by Article II of the Appendix to the
Convention [Special Provisions Regarding Developing Countries], which affirmatively permits
compulsory licensing in developing countries, under certain circumstances, of published and
printed works.
89 See supra notes 47-67 and accompanying text.
90 Cf. Hanna, supra note 7, at 420 ("[T]he primary objective of American copyright law
is to promote the public welfare by enhancing the public's access to an expanding pool of
creative works .... ).
91 The Supreme Court has consistently stated that the primary object of copyright legisla-
tion is promotion of the public welfare. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ('The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return
for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good."); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524 (1994).
("The primary objective of the Copyright Act is to encourage the production of original liter-
ary, artistic, and musical expression for the good of the public."); Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349350 (1991) ("The primary objective of copyright is
not to reward the labor of authors, but 'to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."');
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) ('The mo-
nopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to
provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important
public purpose may be achieved."); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131,
158 (1948) ("The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secon-
dary consideration."); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("The sole interest
of the United States and the primary object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly lie in the
general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors."); see also Sega Enterprises
Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992) ("It is precisely this growth in
creative expression, based on the dissemination of other creative works and the unprotected
ideas contained in those works, that the Copyright Act was intended to promote."), amended
by Order and Amended Opinion, D.C. No. CV-91-3871-BAC, Jan. 6, 1993.
92 See A Coherent Theory, supra note 21, at 67-70; Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protec-
tion of Computer Software, Reverse Engineering, and Professor Miller, 19 DAYTON L. Rnv.
975, 988 (1994) (originally published under the erroneous title Copyright Protection of Com-
puter Documents, Reverse Engineering, and Professor Miller) [hereinafter Reverse Engineer-
ing and Professor Miller].
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was not protected by copyright at all.93 They remain free to limit the
scope of copyright protection in operating software, as they have done
for many other types of works, 94 until Congress explicitly instructs to the
contrary. If the courts find that low levels of innovation and competition
in operating software are harming not only the public's economic interest
in free markets but also the public's fundamental social welfare interest
in optimizing the quality and quantity of available works, there is no
basic conflict between antitrust and copyright. Whatever one's view of
the notion of congressional intent, it would be very difficult to make the
case that Congress affirmatively intended to create an intellectual prop-
erty protection system for computer programs that would likely lead to
unregulated monopoly power in the most important market of the digital
age.95
Moreover, section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it a felony simply
"to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States.196 Over the years the courts have narrowed this flat prohibition
against monopolization to require as a condition for an antitrust violation
that the accused has engaged in some predatory activity or other antiso-
cial behavior. However, this is all judge-made law, admittedly now well
entrenched, that the courts at least in principle are free to reconsider or
refine. The Microsoft litigation provides a good opportunity. Although
the copyright courts have correctly concluded that an antitrust violation
is not a predicate of copyright misuse,97 there is no reason in principle
that the courts could not treat copyright misuse by someone with market
power as an antitrust violation. One step further, and the monopoly it-
self, arising because of market "tipping" and an overly powerful copy-
right, is subject to regulation under antitrust law independent of any
antisocial behavior by the copyright owner - because the combination of
a tipped market and copyright together violates fundamental policy goals
of both statutes.
93 See supra note 31.
94 See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
95 CONTU stated its objectives for copyright protection of programs as follows:
To provide reasonable protection for proprietors without unduly burdening users of
programs and the general public, the following statements concerning program copy-
right ought to be true:
1. Copyright should proscribe the unauthorized copying of these works.
2. Copyright should in no way inhibit the rightful use of these works.
3. Copyright should not block the development and dissemination of these works.
4. Copyright should not grant anyone more economic power than is necessary to
achieve the incentive to create.
CONTU Report, supra note 29, at 12; see generally Reverse Engineering and Professor
Miller, supra note 92, at 998-1000.
96 15 U.S.C. § 2.
97 See supra note 81.
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The traditional antitrust approach that comes to mind is the essential
facilities doctrine. This doctrine starts from United States v. Terminal
Railroad Association98 and applies section 2 of the Sherman Act to per-
sons who own facilities that, as a practical matter, cannot be duplicated.
If such facilities are essential to competition, the owner is required to
share them on fair terms.99 One commentator has pointed out that the
essential facilities doctrine does not, in fact, emphasize wrongful conduct
- the traditional target of antitrust - but rather the provision of a compul-
sory access remedy under antitrust in a setting that is akin to a natural
monopoly.' °° He concludes, as does this article, that treating software
standards as essential facilities would be consistent with the general trend
of the software cases to deny copyright protection to such standards.
Moreover, such treatment represents a good compromise between han-
dling software standards like a regulated industry and heavy-handed (and
in this case unworkable) traditional remedies of antitrust, such as dissolu-
tion.'01 Once we realize that the fundamental problem is independent of
Microsoft's conduct and stems from the natural monopoly represented by
Microsoft's copyrights, we should stop insisting on tying the application
of antitrust law to a traditional antitrust violation involving predatory or
exclusionary conduct. 102
Obviously, any reduction in copyright protection brings at least the-
oretical costs in the form of a lower incentive to create products that
promote the public welfare. There is no reason, however, to think that
traditional copyright law - designed for art, music, and literature - will
automatically draw the public interest/private rights balance at the appro-
priate point for works of technology, especially those with strong net-
work effects.' 0 3 The courts tailor the scope of copyright protection all
the time in an effort to further underlying copyright policies. 1°4 This is
not necessarily easy, but the only fundamentally new aspect suggested
here is that antitrust, rather than copyright itself, supplies the "hook" for
devising remedies that are simply unavailable under copyright, such as
compulsory licensing of the right to make improvements (derivative
works).
98 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
99 See Cotter, supra note 47, at 230-31.
100 See Teague I. Donahey, Terminal Railroad Revisited: Using the Essential Facilities
Doctrine to Ensure Accessibility to Internet Software Standards, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 277, 308
(1997). I am indebted to my student, Dan Bell, for bringing Mr. Donahey's excellent article to
my attention.
101 See id. at 323, 327-28.
102 But see Cotter, supra note 47, at 248, 250 (recommending that the balance between
incentives and access should be addressed through intellectual property law rather than by
means of the essential facilities doctrine of antitrust).
103 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
104 See supra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
190 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9:161
If a traditional antitrust violation is found in the actual Microsoft
case, of course, there will be no need to turn to new theories of liability.
The essential facilities doctrine, however, will still be instructive in de-
signing a remedy. In the case of a traditional violation, the remedy
should relate at least partly to the behavior constituting abuse. However,
it should also correct for the unusual market power arising from the
copyright in operating software. One can only advise the court to use the
utmost caution in moving to regulate one of the most successful business
corporations in United States history. Careful consideration of the un-
derlying policies, together with recognition that the problem arises from
the compound action of network effects and a strong copyright not fully
thought out by Congress, can help the court keep its bearings.
The goal of the court should be to devise limitations on Microsoft's
copyrights that continue to give Microsoft a reasonable return on its con-
tribution to technology but at the same time allow the full software com-
munity to participate in, and profit from, incremental improvements to
the nearly universal base that is Windows. Once the goals and standards
are correctly understood in this case, where (by hypothesis) at least copy-
right misuse has been proved, it may be easier in later decades to deal
with similar monopolies that arise from intellectual property rights, espe-
cially copyright and similar rights, in information technologies. Properly
effected, this approach to Microsoft can be the bridge to a new mode of
thinking about intellectual property monopolies of this type. It might
even stimulate Congress to assess the matter in a more representative and
balanced way than is possible if the problem is treated strictly as one of
copyright.105
As briefly discussed above,106 neither forced separation of
Microsoft's operating system division from its applications division nor
the auctioning of its operating software to a number of purchasers is
105 Professor, now Judge, Calabresi has written about how to determine who should carry
the "burden of inertia" when a validly enacted statute seems no longer to fit "the whole fabric
of the law." Gumo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AcE OF STATrurEs 118-19, 164
(1982). Copyright may represent what he calls "an asymmetry in the effect of a retentionist or
revisionist bias." Id. at 124. As described above, copyright protectionists have access to the
legislative process, while the public interest is unrepresented when legislative compromises are
made. See supra notes 47-67 and accompanying text. If the courts overuse antitrust in at-
tempting to limit the market power of a monopoly that Congress really does believe is in the
public interest, it is relatively easy for the affected interests to have Congress reassess the
matter and reverse the judicial intervention. If, on the other hand, the degree of market power
conferred on the owner of copyright rights in what turns out to be the dominant computer
operating system was simply an unintentional by-product of a more general legislative scheme
(bringing programs under copyright protection), judicial intervention is imperative to over-
come the legislative inertia. In using antitrust to limit monopoly power flowing from such
copyrights, the courts would be placing the burden of inertia "on the side that can more easily
obtain majoritarian reconsideration of the allocation." CALABRESI, supra at 126.
106 See supra note 87.
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likely solve the basic structural problem in the long run. Because the
goal should be to allow innovative improvement by the whole of the
software technology community, rather than just Microsoft, the best ap-
proach may be a mandatory publishing of the source code and all sup-
porting documentation for Microsoft's operating software. This should
be coupled with a judicially enforced compulsory license that will allow
third parties to develop improved versions of the software, with some
royalty payment to Microsoft to reward it for its contribution to the now-
improved technology.
This suggested remedy raises questions about the improved versions
of Windows that we would expect to appear on the market after the com-
pulsory license is put into effect. Network effects will continue to be at
work in the market for Windows improvements, so it is quite possible
that the market will again "tip" in the direction of one of their number. If
full proprietary rights exist in the improved versions, we run the risk of
returning to our starting point, with some other company now holding the
key to the gateway through its copyright in the new standard. On the
other hand, it is possible that many of the improvers will be believers in
open systems, and tipping could be in that direction. There is little point
in basing a once-and-for-all solution to such future problems on specula-
tion. Nor is there any need for a definite answer today. The most con-
servative approach is to go forward with what we are used to, which
means the recognition of proprietary rights in improvements as in other
computer programs. The court could retain jurisdiction, however, to
force a second round of compulsory licensing (as part of the initial li-
cense) when and if a new monopoly develops that again threatens to
stifle innovation. 10 7
107 Professor Lemley has raised the very important question of how this theory would
apply outside the context of operating software. Does it apply to patents, for example, or to
Intel Corporation's dominant position in microprocessors? The best answer I can give at this
point is that we should move cautiously in any such area. Crucial to the analysis here is the
combination of strong network effects and an overly powerful copyright. While in principle
the same situation could develop if one company has a dominant and fundamental patent, I am
unaware of any patent that gives the kind of power in a huge market that Microsoft derives
from its operating system copyrights. Moreover, the patent term of 20 years may make accept-
ance of one-firm domination more tolerable, should it occur. Intel's position in microproces-
sors does seem to be closer to Microsoft's position in operating software. A possible
distinction is the nature of the intellectual property rights pursuant to which Intel maintains its
position. While Intel and one of its competitors, Advanced Micro Devices, have disputed over
microcode, both companies (and others) make chips that run the most popular software, which
suggests that the copyright in microcode (if any) may not be crucial to Intel's dominance.
Moreover, to the extent Intel relies on the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, the 10-year
period of protection may again be short enough to make its monopoly tolerable, should Intel
stop innovating. Following the rule that one should be conservative when one does not know
what to do, the better part of valor at this time is likely to worry about the Microsoft problem
and to use our experience from attempts to resolve it when problems develop in these other
areas.
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is time to begin thinking "outside the box." For reasons that we
may not condone, but cannot ignore, Congress is institutionally incapable
of retrenching the rapid growth in the length, breadth, and strength of
copyright protection that we have witnessed with the adoption of the
1976 Copyright Act and subsequent copyright legislation. Copyright
protection for computer programs, notwithstanding their technological
nature, seemed like a reasonable idea for protecting these works from
out-and-out piracy. Although it was foreseeable, Congress did not fore-
see that this apparently simple decision would lead to a long-term mo-
nopoly in a technological gateway. The fundamental problem is
structural: Network effects inexorably lead to a single dominant firm in
operating software. If the dominant firm has proprietary rights in that
software, we can expect to see lower levels of innovation and monopoly
rents, even if the dominant firm does not otherwise engage in predatory
or other antisocial activity that heretofore has been a necessary predicate
of an antitrust claim.
The government has now succeeded in proving that Microsoft did,
in fact, engage in the behavior of which it was accused. The case thus
becomes a good one for testing the kinds of structural remedies that
courts can use to deal with the problem of a copyright that is stronger
than socially optimal. The court will not have to invent any new legal
theories to get to the remedies question, assuming that Microsoft's preda-
tory behavior is also determined to be an antitrust violation. That gives
us both time and experience with which to ponder appropriate action
even in those cases in which the -dominant firm has not abused its mo-
nopoly position in a traditional antitrust sense. Whatever the details in a
particular case, that action must be aimed at the source of the problem,
which is treating operating software under copyright as if it were a novel.
It is the copyright that must be limited, not the structure of the company
owning it or the market in which it operates.
